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When entering a monetary union, member-countries change the nature of their sovereign debt 
in a fundamental way, i.e. they cease to have control over the currency in which their debt is 
issued. As a result, financial markets can force these countries’ sovereigns into default. In this 
sense member countries of a monetary union are downgraded to the status of emerging 
economies. This makes the monetary union fragile and vulnerable to changing market 
sentiments. It also makes it possible that self-fulfilling multiple equilibria arise. 
I analyze the implications of this fragility for the governance of the Eurozone. I conclude that 
the new governance structure (ESM) does not sufficiently recognize this fragility. Some of the 
features of the new financial assistance are likely to increase this fragility. In addition, it is 
also likely to rip member-countries of their ability to use the automatic stabilizers during a 
recession. This is surely a step backward in the long history of social progress in Europe. I 
suggest a different approach to deal with these problems. 
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2	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠIntroduction	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ right	 ﾠ diagnosis	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ nature	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ debt	 ﾠ crisis	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Eurozone.	 ﾠFailure	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesigning	 ﾠa	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
inappropriate	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
argue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠemerged	 ﾠafter	 ﾠa	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠsuccessive	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠmeetings,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠstep	 ﾠforwards,	 ﾠ
fails	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠsome	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠA	 ﾠParadox	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠstart	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparadox	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠvisible	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠof	 ﾠFigures	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ1	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠto	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠratios	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠand	 ﾠSpain.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
seen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠratio	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
UK	 ﾠhas	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpain.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
GDP	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠstood	 ﾠ17%	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠGovernment	 ﾠ
debt	 ﾠ(89%	 ﾠversus	 ﾠ72%).	 ﾠYet	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ2	 ﾠit	 ﾠappears	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠsingled	 ﾠout	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠget	 ﾠentangled	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠcrisis.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstart	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
2010	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyield	 ﾠon	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠhas	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠUK,	 ﾠsuggesting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠprice	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Spanish	 ﾠthan	 ﾠon	 ﾠUK	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠearly	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠamounted	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ200	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠpoints.	 ﾠWhy	 ﾠis	 ﾠit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠattach	 ﾠa	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠ
risk	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ Spanish	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ UK	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ bonds	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ bonds,	 ﾠ while	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ
appears	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠa	 ﾠless	 ﾠfavourable	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠand	 ﾠdeficit	 ﾠdynamics?	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠsector.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠis	 ﾠunconvincing,	 ﾠthough.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠsector	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
much	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Spain.	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ argue	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ difference	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
evaluation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠbelongs	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠissues	 ﾠits	 ﾠdebt.	 ﾠ
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3.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠa	 ﾠnutshell	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐members	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠboils	 ﾠdown	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing.	 ﾠMembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠissue	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠcontrol.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠ
follows	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ markets	 ﾠ acquire	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ force	 ﾠ default	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ
countries.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠin	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ kept	 ﾠ control	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ currency	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ issue	 ﾠ debt.	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠbe	 ﾠforced	 ﾠinto	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠby	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠ
Let	 ﾠme	 ﾠexpand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠby	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠin	 ﾠdetail	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhappens	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠ
start	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠdoubts	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠUK	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠprototype	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠ“stand-ﾭ‐alone”	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠand	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠprototype	 ﾠ
member-ﾭ‐country	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠKopf(2011)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠinsightful	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠWinkler(2011)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ19th	 ﾠCentury	 ﾠUS	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠ
system).	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠUK	 ﾠscenario	 ﾠ
Let’s	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ trace	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ happen	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ investors	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ fear	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ UK	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdefaulting	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠdebt.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsell	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠUK	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠbonds,	 ﾠdriving	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate.	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠselling	 ﾠthese	 ﾠbonds,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
investors	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠpounds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠrid	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠselling	 ﾠthem	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprice	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpound	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
drop	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠsomebody	 ﾠelse	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpounds.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
mechanism	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpounds	 ﾠwould	 ﾠremain	 ﾠbottled	 ﾠup	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinvested	 ﾠin	 ﾠUK	 ﾠassets.	 ﾠPut	 ﾠdifferently,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠstock	 ﾠwould	 ﾠremain	 ﾠ
unchanged.	 ﾠPart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstock	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠwould	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠbe	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐invested	 ﾠin	 ﾠUK	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠ securities.	 ﾠ But	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ UK	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠto	 ﾠroll	 ﾠover	 ﾠits	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠat	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠ
rates,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠforce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBank	 ﾠof	 ﾠEngland	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠ
securities.	 ﾠThus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠis	 ﾠensured	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠis	 ﾠaround	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
fund	 ﾠits	 ﾠdebt.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠprecipitate	 ﾠa	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
UK	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠforce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠinto	 ﾠdefault.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsuperior	 ﾠforce	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
last	 ﾠresort,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBank	 ﾠof	 ﾠEngland.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠscenario	 ﾠ
Things	 ﾠare	 ﾠdramatically	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠmember	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠSpain.	 ﾠ
Suppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠfear	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠgovernment.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠsell	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds,	 ﾠraising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠfar,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
same	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠis	 ﾠvery	 ﾠdifferent.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠacquired	 ﾠeuros	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠdecide	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvest	 ﾠthese	 ﾠeuros	 ﾠelsewhere,	 ﾠsay	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
German	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ bonds.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ result,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ euros	 ﾠ leave	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Spanish	 ﾠ banking	 ﾠ
system.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠa	 ﾠflexible	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrate	 ﾠto	 ﾠstop	 ﾠ
this.	 ﾠThus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠ(money	 ﾠsupply)	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠshrinks.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Spanish	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠa	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠcrisis,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠit	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
roll	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ debt	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ reasonable	 ﾠ interest	 ﾠ rates.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ addition,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Spanish	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠforce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBank	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdebt.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
control	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ institution.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ liquidity	 ﾠ crisis,	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ strong	 ﾠ enough,	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ force	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Spanish	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠinto	 ﾠdefault.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthis	 ﾠand	 ﾠwill	 ﾠtest	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Spanish	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ budget	 ﾠ deficits	 ﾠ deteriorate.	 ﾠ Thus,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ monetary	 ﾠ
union,	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠtremendous	 ﾠpower	 ﾠand	 ﾠcan	 ﾠforce	 ﾠany	 ﾠmember	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠknees.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠis	 ﾠreminiscent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠof	 ﾠemerging	 ﾠeconomies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠto	 ﾠborrow	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠcurrency.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠemerging	 ﾠeconomies	 ﾠface	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
problem,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsuddenly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconfronted	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“sudden	 ﾠstop”	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠ
inflows	 ﾠsuddenly	 ﾠstop	 ﾠleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠCalvo,	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2006)).	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ additional	 ﾠ difference	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ debt	 ﾠ dynamics	 ﾠ imposed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ
markets	 ﾠon	 ﾠmember	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐member	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠ
scenario	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠas	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠsell	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproceeds	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbond	 ﾠsales	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠdepreciates.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠUK	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠis	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠa	 ﾠboost	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠUK	 ﾠinflation	 ﾠincreases.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠabsent	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠscenario.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproceeds	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbond	 ﾠsales	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠleave	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠany	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠprice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ3	 ﾠand	 ﾠ4	 ﾠI	 ﾠshow	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠhas	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠinflation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠand	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEurozone.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠinflation	 ﾠis	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠtwice	 ﾠas	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠin	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠUK	 ﾠthan	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠ(2.9%	 ﾠversus	 ﾠ1.6%).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyearly	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠof	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠUK	 ﾠaverages	 ﾠ2%	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ0.2%	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
unrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpound	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
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This	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠin	 ﾠinflation	 ﾠand	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠprofound	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
solvency	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ governments	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ perceived.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
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surplus	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠas	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnominal	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠ
rate	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnominal	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠrate	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠratio1.	 ﾠI	 ﾠapply	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
show	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠin	 ﾠtable	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠI	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠface	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ long-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠ interest	 ﾠ rates	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ markets	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ imposed	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ last	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ
months	 ﾠ(on	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠ3.5%	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠand	 ﾠ5%	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain).	 ﾠApplying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠ
nominal	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠrates	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠ(4.9%	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1.8%	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain)	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsee	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠa	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠsurplus	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠstabilize	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠto	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠratio	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠassuming	 ﾠthese	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠrates	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmaintained).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
Spain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠsurplus	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ2%	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠthis	 ﾠresult.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠ
Spain	 ﾠis	 ﾠforced	 ﾠto	 ﾠapply	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠmore	 ﾠausterity	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠto	 ﾠsatisfy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠ
condition.	 ﾠPut	 ﾠdifferently,	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠget	 ﾠaway	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠbranded	 ﾠas	 ﾠinsolvent	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubstantially	 ﾠ
lower	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠ	 ﾠPrimary	 ﾠsurplus	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠto	 ﾠstabilize	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠat	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(percent	 ﾠGDP)	 ﾠ
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The	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠillustrates	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠdestructive	 ﾠdynamics	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ monetary	 ﾠ union.	 ﾠ Members	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ monetary	 ﾠ union	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ susceptible	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
liquidity	 ﾠmovements.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠfear	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠtriggered	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ recession	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ leads	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ budget	 ﾠ deficit),	 ﾠ
liquidity	 ﾠis	 ﾠwithdrawn	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ(a	 ﾠ“sudden	 ﾠstop”).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcan	 ﾠset	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠmotion	 ﾠa	 ﾠdevilish	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠand	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠcrises.	 ﾠOnce	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
member	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠgets	 ﾠentangled	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠcrisis,	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrates	 ﾠare	 ﾠpushed	 ﾠup.	 ﾠ
Thus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠturns	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠcrisis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠInvestors	 ﾠcan	 ﾠthen	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠpull	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠnational	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
self-ﾭ‐fulfilling	 ﾠprophecy:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠinsolvent	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠfear	 ﾠ
insolvency.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠThe	 ﾠformula	 ﾠis	 ﾠS	 ﾠ≥	 ﾠ(r	 ﾠ–	 ﾠg)D	 ﾠ,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠS	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠsurplus,	 ﾠr	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
nominal	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdebt,	 ﾠg	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnominal	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠand	 ﾠD	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠto	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠratio.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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Note	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot	 ﾠarguing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠare	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
nature.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Greece,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ example,	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ argue	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Greek	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠwas	 ﾠinsolvent	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠmade	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmoves	 ﾠand	 ﾠtriggered	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
liquidity	 ﾠ crisis	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ May	 ﾠ 2010.	 ﾠ What	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ am	 ﾠ arguing	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ monetary	 ﾠ union	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠvulnerable	 ﾠto	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐fulfilling	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠof	 ﾠdistrust	 ﾠthat	 ﾠset	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
motion	 ﾠa	 ﾠdevilish	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠand	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠcrises.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠand	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠis	 ﾠavoided	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“stand-ﾭ‐alone”	 ﾠ
country,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠis	 ﾠbottled	 ﾠup	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠ(there	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
no	 ﾠ “sudden	 ﾠ stop”),	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ attempts	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ markets	 ﾠ sets	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
motion	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ equilibrating	 ﾠ mechanism,	 ﾠ produced	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ depreciation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
currency.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠparadoxically,	 ﾠdistrust	 ﾠleads	 ﾠto	 ﾠand	 ﾠequilibrating	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠUK,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠdisequilibrating	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
From	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ preceding	 ﾠ analysis,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ follows	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ markets	 ﾠ acquire	 ﾠ great	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion.	 ﾠWill	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpower	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunion?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Believers	 ﾠin	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠtelling	 ﾠus	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpower	 ﾠis	 ﾠsalutary,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠwill	 ﾠact	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdisciplining	 ﾠforce	 ﾠon	 ﾠbad	 ﾠgovernments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlost	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
faith	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠdisciplining	 ﾠforce.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠmade	 ﾠabundantly	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠare	 ﾠoften	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠby	 ﾠextreme	 ﾠ
sentiments	 ﾠof	 ﾠeither	 ﾠeuphoria	 ﾠor	 ﾠpanic.	 ﾠDuring	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠof	 ﾠeuphoria	 ﾠinvestors,	 ﾠ
cheered	 ﾠby	 ﾠrating	 ﾠagencies,	 ﾠcollectively	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠand	 ﾠtake	 ﾠon	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ it.	 ﾠ After	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ crash,	 ﾠ fear	 ﾠ dominates,	 ﾠ leading	 ﾠ investors,	 ﾠ prodded	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ rating	 ﾠ
agencies,	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetect	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠeverywhere	 ﾠtriggering	 ﾠpanic	 ﾠsales	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠMultiple	 ﾠequilibria	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ inherent	 ﾠ volatility	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ markets	 ﾠ leads	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ another	 ﾠ fundamental	 ﾠ
problem.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcan	 ﾠgive	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠequilibria,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠgood	 ﾠones;	 ﾠothers	 ﾠ
bad	 ﾠones.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠarises	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐fulfilling	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠexpectations.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
next	 ﾠsection,	 ﾠI	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠshowing	 ﾠmore	 ﾠformally	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ
multiple	 ﾠequilibria	 ﾠcan	 ﾠarise.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsection	 ﾠI	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠverbally.	 ﾠ
Suppose	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠtrust	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠA.	 ﾠInvestors	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwill	 ﾠshow	 ﾠa	 ﾠwillingness	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
buy	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠlow	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate.	 ﾠA	 ﾠlow	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠembodies	 ﾠa	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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belief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠis	 ﾠlow.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠlow	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ producing	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ low	 ﾠ risk	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ default.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ made	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ clear	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ
solvency	 ﾠcalculations	 ﾠin	 ﾠtable	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠMarkets	 ﾠtrust	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
default	 ﾠ(despite	 ﾠits	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠratio).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠ
enjoys	 ﾠa	 ﾠlow	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate.	 ﾠOur	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠcalculation	 ﾠthen	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
UK	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠis	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsolvent.	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠgently	 ﾠguide	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
good	 ﾠequilibrium.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Suppose	 ﾠ market	 ﾠ distrusts	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ B.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ result,	 ﾠ investors	 ﾠ sell	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠbonds.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠensuing	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠembeds	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrisk.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠactually	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠ
default	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ likely.	 ﾠ Thus	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ calculation	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ table	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ appears	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
market’s	 ﾠdistrust	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐fulfilling	 ﾠway	 ﾠhas	 ﾠmade	 ﾠ
default	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely.	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠpush	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠequilibrium.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠoccurrence	 ﾠof	 ﾠbad	 ﾠequilibria	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠ
union,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠissue	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdebt,	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠstand-ﾭ‐alone	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠissued	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠfull	 ﾠcontrol.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠearlier,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠface	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ problem	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ emerging	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ underdeveloped	 ﾠ
domestic	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠare	 ﾠforced	 ﾠto	 ﾠissue	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠ
(Calvo,	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2006),	 ﾠsee	 ﾠEichengreen,	 ﾠat	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2005)).	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwords	 ﾠof	 ﾠEichengreen	 ﾠ
et	 ﾠal.(2005)	 ﾠthis	 ﾠworks	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“original	 ﾠsin”	 ﾠthat	 ﾠleads	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠ
equilibrium	 ﾠfull	 ﾠof	 ﾠpain	 ﾠand	 ﾠmisery.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠcomplication	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
union	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ markets	 ﾠ become	 ﾠ highly	 ﾠ integrated.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ implies	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠ bonds	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ member	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ held	 ﾠ throughout	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ union.	 ﾠ
According	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBIS	 ﾠdata,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmany	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠhalf	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠare	 ﾠheld	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠof	 ﾠissue.	 ﾠThus	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠ
equilibrium	 ﾠis	 ﾠforced	 ﾠon	 ﾠsome	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠand	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠ
sectors	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ enjoying	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ good	 ﾠ equilibrium	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ affected	 ﾠ (see	 ﾠ
Azerki,	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2011)	 ﾠwho	 ﾠfind	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠspillover	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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These	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠforce	 ﾠof	 ﾠinstability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠaction.	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠissue	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠanalyze	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone.	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠwrap	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠdiscussion:	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠare	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
movements	 ﾠof	 ﾠdistrust	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐fulfilling	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlead	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpushed	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠequilibrium.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠarises	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠdistrust	 ﾠcan	 ﾠset	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
motion	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ devilish	 ﾠ interaction	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ liquidity	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ solvency	 ﾠ crises.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Being	 ﾠ
pushed	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠhas	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠconsequences.	 ﾠI	 ﾠanalyze	 ﾠthese	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠsection.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
5.	 ﾠA	 ﾠSimple	 ﾠModel	 ﾠof	 ﾠGood	 ﾠand	 ﾠBad	 ﾠEquilibria	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsection	 ﾠI	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠillustrating	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠequilibria	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
arise.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcost	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefaulting	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
debt,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcalculus	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount.	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
assume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠis	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠshock,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
decline	 ﾠin	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠrevenues.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcaused	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠrecession,	 ﾠor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
loss	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompetitiveness.	 ﾠI’ll	 ﾠcall	 ﾠthis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠshock.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthis	 ﾠshock	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
greater	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠloss	 ﾠof	 ﾠsolvency.	 ﾠI	 ﾠconcentrate	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠside.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
represented	 ﾠin	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ5.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhorizontal	 ﾠaxis	 ﾠI	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠshock.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
vertical	 ﾠ axis	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ represent	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ benefit	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ defaulting.	 ﾠ There	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
degrees	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefaulting.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠsimplify	 ﾠI	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠhaircut	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
fixed	 ﾠpercentage.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefaulting	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
reduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠburden	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutstanding	 ﾠdebt.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠapply	 ﾠless	 ﾠausterity,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠspending	 ﾠand/or	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠ taxes	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ without	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ default.	 ﾠ Since	 ﾠ austerity	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ politically	 ﾠ
costly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠprofits	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefault.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠinsight	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠis	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠI	 ﾠshow	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠcurves	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
default.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBU	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠto	 ﾠhappen,	 ﾠ
while	 ﾠBE	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠto	 ﾠhappen.	 ﾠLet	 ﾠme	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠ
concentrate	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBU	 ﾠcurve.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠupward	 ﾠsloping	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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shock	 ﾠincreases,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠup.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠshock	 ﾠis	 ﾠlarge,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecline	 ﾠin	 ﾠtax	 ﾠincome	 ﾠis	 ﾠlarge,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ austerity	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ substantial.	 ﾠ Default	 ﾠ then	 ﾠ becomes	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ attractive	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
sovereign.	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcurve	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐linear,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠessential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ argument.	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ distinguish	 ﾠ three	 ﾠ factors	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ affect	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ position	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
steepness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBU	 ﾠcurve:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
•  The	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
default.	 ﾠThus	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBU	 ﾠcurve	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrotate	 ﾠupwards.	 ﾠ
•  The	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtax	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠinefficient	 ﾠtax	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠ cannot	 ﾠ easily	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ taxation.	 ﾠ Thus	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
option	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefaulting	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠmore	 ﾠattractive.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠBU	 ﾠcurve	 ﾠrotates	 ﾠupwards.	 ﾠ
•  The	 ﾠsize	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠdebt.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠproportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
total	 ﾠ debt	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ resistance	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ default,	 ﾠ
making	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠmore	 ﾠattractive	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠBU	 ﾠcurve	 ﾠrotates	 ﾠupwards).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ5:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠafter	 ﾠa	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠshock	 ﾠ
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I	 ﾠnow	 ﾠconcentrate	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBE	 ﾠcurve.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
investors	 ﾠ anticipate	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ default.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ located	 ﾠ above	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ BU	 ﾠ curve	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
following	 ﾠ reason.	 ﾠ When	 ﾠ investors	 ﾠ expect	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ default,	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ sell	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ
bonds.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠon	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠincreases.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠraises	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠdeficit	 ﾠrequiring	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠintense	 ﾠausterity	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
spending	 ﾠcuts	 ﾠand	 ﾠtax	 ﾠhikes.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠmore	 ﾠattractive.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠevery	 ﾠ
solvency	 ﾠshock,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnow	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠanticipated.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠnow	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefault.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠarises	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
fact	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠdefaulting,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠsuffers	 ﾠa	 ﾠloss	 ﾠof	 ﾠreputation.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠloss	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠreputation	 ﾠwill	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠto	 ﾠborrow	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture.	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimplifying	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠcost.	 ﾠI	 ﾠnow	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠI	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠcost	 ﾠ(C)	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠcurves.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ6:	 ﾠCost	 ﾠand	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠafter	 ﾠa	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠshock	 ﾠ
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I	 ﾠnow	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtools	 ﾠto	 ﾠanalyze	 ﾠthe	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodel.	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠthree	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠshocks,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠone,	 ﾠan	 ﾠintermediate	 ﾠone,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
BU	 ﾠ
BE	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠC	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
S1	 ﾠ 	 ﾠS2	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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large	 ﾠone.	 ﾠTake	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠshock:	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠshock	 ﾠ	 ﾠS	 ﾠ<	 ﾠS1	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(This	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
shocks	 ﾠthat	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNetherlands	 ﾠexperienced	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠcrisis).	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠshock	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠis	 ﾠalways	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠ(both	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠan	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠunexpected	 ﾠdefault).	 ﾠThus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
default.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠexpectations	 ﾠare	 ﾠrational	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
result,	 ﾠ	 ﾠa	 ﾠno-ﾭ‐default	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsustained.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Let	 ﾠus	 ﾠnow	 ﾠanalyze	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠshock.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠS	 ﾠ>	 ﾠS2.	 ﾠ(This	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshock	 ﾠexperienced	 ﾠby	 ﾠGreece).	 ﾠFor	 ﾠall	 ﾠthese	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠshocks	 ﾠwe	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠis	 ﾠalways	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠ(both	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ unexpected	 ﾠ default).	 ﾠ Thus	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ want	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ default.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠ expectations	 ﾠ framework,	 ﾠ investors	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ anticipate	 ﾠ this.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ result,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
default	 ﾠis	 ﾠinevitable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠnow	 ﾠturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintermediate	 ﾠcase:	 ﾠ	 ﾠS1	 ﾠ<	 ﾠS	 ﾠ<	 ﾠS2.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(This	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshocks	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Ireland,	 ﾠPortugal	 ﾠand	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠexperienced).	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthese	 ﾠintermediate	 ﾠshocks	 ﾠI	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠindeterminacy,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠequilibria	 ﾠare	 ﾠpossible.	 ﾠWhich	 ﾠone	 ﾠwill	 ﾠprevail	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
depends	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠexpected.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠshock	 ﾠis	 ﾠS’	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ7).	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠequilibria,	 ﾠD	 ﾠand	 ﾠN.	 ﾠTake	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠD.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠ(D	 ﾠis	 ﾠlocated	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBE	 ﾠline).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ making	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ benefit	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ default	 ﾠ larger	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ C.	 ﾠ Thus,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdefault.	 ﾠD	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠexpectations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠ point	 ﾠ N	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ equally	 ﾠ good	 ﾠ candidate	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ equilibrium	 ﾠ point.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ N,	 ﾠ
investors	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠ(N	 ﾠis	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBU	 ﾠline).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
default	 ﾠis	 ﾠlower	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost.	 ﾠThus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdefault.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠN	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠan	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠexpectations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Thus	 ﾠwe	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠequilibria,	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠone	 ﾠ(D)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠleads	 ﾠto	 ﾠdefault,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
good	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ (N	 ﾠ )	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ lead	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ default.	 ﾠ Both	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ equally	 ﾠ possible.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ
selection	 ﾠof	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠonly	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠexpect.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
latter	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠone;	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
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Since	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ lot	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ uncertainty	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ likelihood	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ default,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ
investors	 ﾠhave	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠscientific	 ﾠfoundation	 ﾠto	 ﾠcalculate	 ﾠprobabilities	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠ
(there	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠnone	 ﾠin	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠ60	 ﾠyears),	 ﾠexpectations	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
likely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠby	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠsentiments	 ﾠof	 ﾠoptimism	 ﾠand	 ﾠpessimism.	 ﾠ
Small	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠsentiments	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
type	 ﾠof	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠto	 ﾠanother.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠequilibria	 ﾠis	 ﾠunlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
stand-ﾭ‐alone	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠissue	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠcurrency.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠto	 ﾠalways	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠoutright	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠforced	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
avoid	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠoutcome.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠcurve.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠcan	 ﾠstill	 ﾠdecide	 ﾠto	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠshock	 ﾠis	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠ
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6.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠbad	 ﾠnews	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠare	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠworth	 ﾠanalyzing	 ﾠfurther.	 ﾠ
First,	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ banks	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ affected	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ bad	 ﾠ equilibrium	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ ways.	 ﾠ
When	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠpull	 ﾠout	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠ bonds	 ﾠ increases.	 ﾠ Since	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ banks	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ usually	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ main	 ﾠ
investors	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠshows	 ﾠup	 ﾠas	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠ
losses	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠsheets.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠare	 ﾠcaught	 ﾠup	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
funding	 ﾠproblem.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠargued	 ﾠearlier,	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠdries	 ﾠup	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠstock	 ﾠ
declines)	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠit	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠto	 ﾠrollover	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdeposits,	 ﾠ
except	 ﾠby	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠprohibitive	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrates.	 ﾠThus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠspills	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠcrisis,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsound	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
start	 ﾠwith.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠhas	 ﾠplayed	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠGreece	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Portugal	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠfull-ﾭ‐blown	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠcrisis.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠIreland,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠprior	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠ
crisis	 ﾠ(which	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠtriggered	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠcrisis).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlatter,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠ
intensified	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠcrisis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Second,	 ﾠ once	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ bad	 ﾠ equilibrium,	 ﾠ members	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ monetary	 ﾠ union	 ﾠ find	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ
difficult	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ automatic	 ﾠ budget	 ﾠ stabilizers:	 ﾠ A	 ﾠ recession	 ﾠ leads	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ higher	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠ budget	 ﾠ deficits;	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ turn	 ﾠ leads	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ distrust	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ markets	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠto	 ﾠservice	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠdebt,	 ﾠtriggering	 ﾠa	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
solvency	 ﾠcrisis;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠthen	 ﾠforces	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠinstitute	 ﾠausterity	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
midst	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ recession.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ stand-ﾭ‐alone	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ (UK)	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ happen	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ distrust	 ﾠ generated	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ higher	 ﾠ budget	 ﾠ deficit	 ﾠ triggers	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ stabilizing	 ﾠ
mechanism.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Thus,	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠare	 ﾠdowngraded	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
emerging	 ﾠeconomies,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠfind	 ﾠit	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠif	 ﾠnot	 ﾠimpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠ
policies	 ﾠto	 ﾠstabilize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠcycle.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠshown	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠ
pronounced	 ﾠbooms	 ﾠand	 ﾠbusts	 ﾠin	 ﾠemerging	 ﾠeconomies	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠEichengreen,	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ
(2005)).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠvery	 ﾠcostly.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠautomatic	 ﾠ
stabilizers	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠachievement	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠworld	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠsoften	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpain	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmany	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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booms	 ﾠand	 ﾠbusts	 ﾠin	 ﾠcapitalist	 ﾠsocieties.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
destroying	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ automatic	 ﾠ stabilizers,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ unclear	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠunion	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmaintained.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
design	 ﾠa	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmaintains	 ﾠthese	 ﾠautomatic	 ﾠstabilizers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
7.	 ﾠCompetitiveness	 ﾠand	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ previous	 ﾠ analysis	 ﾠ allows	 ﾠ us	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ connect	 ﾠ sovereign	 ﾠ debt	 ﾠ dynamics	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
competitiveness	 ﾠproblems.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ now	 ﾠ widely	 ﾠ recognized	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fundamental	 ﾠ imbalances	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Eurozone	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠdivergence	 ﾠin	 ﾠcompetitive	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ2000.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠphenomenon	 ﾠis	 ﾠshown	 ﾠin	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠ8,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠ
confident	 ﾠmost	 ﾠreaders	 ﾠmust	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen	 ﾠsomewhere.	 ﾠOne	 ﾠmay	 ﾠcriticize	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2000	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbase	 ﾠyear.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠassumes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ 2000	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ imbalances	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ competitive	 ﾠ positions,	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ
movement	 ﾠaway	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2000-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeparture	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠ
problematic.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠAlcidi	 ﾠand	 ﾠGros(2010).	 ﾠA	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ far	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ equilibrium	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ 2000	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ movements	 ﾠ
observed	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdate	 ﾠcould	 ﾠconceivably	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠequilibrium.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcriticism	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠI	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠunit	 ﾠlabour	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ1970-ﾭ‐2010	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbase.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠare	 ﾠshown	 ﾠin	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠ9.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdivergence	 ﾠis	 ﾠless	 ﾠspectacular,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠstill	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsignificant.	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ10	 ﾠconfirms	 ﾠthis:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
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Figure	 ﾠ9:	 ﾠRelative	 ﾠunit	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠin	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(average	 ﾠ1970-ﾭ‐2010	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ100)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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Note:	 ﾠComputed	 ﾠusing	 ﾠdata	 ﾠof	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ9.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlost	 ﾠcompetitiveness	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ1999	 ﾠto	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠ(Greece,	 ﾠPortugal,	 ﾠ
Spain,	 ﾠ Ireland)	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ start	 ﾠ improving	 ﾠ it.	 ﾠ Given	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ impossibility	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ using	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
devaluation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ currency,	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ devaluation	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ engineered,	 ﾠ i.e.	 ﾠ
wages	 ﾠand	 ﾠprices	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠdown	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompetitors.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ achieved	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ deflationary	 ﾠ macroeconomic	 ﾠ policies	 ﾠ (mainly	 ﾠ
budgetary	 ﾠ policies).	 ﾠ Inevitably,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ lead	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ recession	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ thus	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ operation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ automatic	 ﾠ stabilizers)	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ increases	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ budget	 ﾠ
deficits.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Most	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalyses	 ﾠin	 ﾠtextbooks	 ﾠnow	 ﾠstop	 ﾠby	 ﾠnoting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠslow	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
painful	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠsections,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠallows	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠgo	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
little	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠlink	 ﾠit	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠdynamics	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠearlier.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠ increasing	 ﾠ budget	 ﾠ deficits	 ﾠ while	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ attempt	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ improve	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
competitiveness,	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠnervous.	 ﾠDistrust	 ﾠmay	 ﾠinstall	 ﾠ
itself.	 ﾠ If	 ﾠ strong	 ﾠ enough,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ latter	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ lead	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ liquidity	 ﾠ crisis	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ described	 ﾠ
before.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠthen	 ﾠinevitably	 ﾠtriggers	 ﾠa	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠcrisis.	 ﾠ
Thus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠduring	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠimprove	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcompetitiveness	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
likely	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ painful	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ turbulent:	 ﾠ Painful,	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ recession	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
ensuing	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠunemployment;	 ﾠturbulent,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadjustment	 ﾠ
period,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcounty	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhit	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠ	 ﾠand	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠcrises.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠ


















Figure	 ﾠ10:	 ﾠStandard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠunit	 ﾠlabour	 ﾠ
costs	 ﾠin	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠpercent)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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domestic	 ﾠlong	 ﾠterm	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠdramatically,	 ﾠforcing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠapply	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmore	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠausterity,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn	 ﾠleads	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
intense	 ﾠrecession.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠtrapped	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
credit	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ economy.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ finds	 ﾠ itself	 ﾠ stuck	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ bad	 ﾠ equilibrium,	 ﾠ
characterized	 ﾠby	 ﾠausterity	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠdeficits	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠdownward	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠspiral	 ﾠand	 ﾠpunishing	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠlevels.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
path	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠrecovery	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcrisis-ﾭ‐
prone.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠwith	 ﾠstand-ﾭ‐alone	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠissue	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠown	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠis	 ﾠstark.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlost	 ﾠcompetitiveness,	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠwill	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠrestore	 ﾠit	 ﾠby	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠto	 ﾠdrop	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠ
exchange	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠdeflation,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
avoid	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ sovereign	 ﾠ debt	 ﾠ crisis.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ seen	 ﾠ earlier,	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ countries’	 ﾠ
governments	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠforced	 ﾠinto	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠby	 ﾠtriggering	 ﾠa	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠcrisis.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠadjustment	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠdepreciation	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
boost	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠand	 ﾠinflation,	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠimproving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
8.	 ﾠGovernance	 ﾠissues	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠforced	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠleaders	 ﾠto	 ﾠset	 ﾠup	 ﾠnew	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
dealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrisis.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠspectacular	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ Financial	 ﾠ Stability	 ﾠ Mechanism	 ﾠ (EFSF)	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ May	 ﾠ 2010	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
transformed	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ permanent	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ rescue	 ﾠ fund,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ Stability	 ﾠ
Mechanism	 ﾠ(ESM)	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ2013	 ﾠon.	 ﾠSurely	 ﾠthese	 ﾠwere	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
necessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone.	 ﾠ
Yet	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ opposition	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ decisions	 ﾠ continues	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ high	 ﾠ especially	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
Northern	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠOpposition	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠamong	 ﾠeconomists	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatement	 ﾠof	 ﾠ189	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠeconomists	 ﾠwarning	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
future	 ﾠ calamities	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EFSF	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ made	 ﾠ permanent,	 ﾠ Plenum	 ﾠ der	 ﾠ
Ökonomen,	 ﾠ(2011)).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ opposition	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ based	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ incomplete	 ﾠ diagnosis	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ sovereign	 ﾠ debt	 ﾠ
problem	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ189	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠeconomists	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstory	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimple:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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some	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ (Greece,	 ﾠ Ireland,	 ﾠ Portugal,	 ﾠ Spain)	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ misbehaved.	 ﾠ Their	 ﾠ
governments	 ﾠhave	 ﾠirresponsibly	 ﾠspent	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠmuch,	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠunsustainable	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠ
levels.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠare	 ﾠnow	 ﾠinsolvent	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠmistakes.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
providing	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthem	 ﾠsolvent.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
gives	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ incentives	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ persevere	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ irresponsible	 ﾠ behavior	 ﾠ (moral	 ﾠ hazard).	 ﾠ
Thus	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ diagnostics,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ problem	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ debt	 ﾠ crisis	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ limited	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
individual	 ﾠ countries,	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ solved	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ orderly	 ﾠ debt	 ﾠ default	 ﾠ
mechanism.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠis	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠthat	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠtaxpayers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠfoot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
bill.	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠthis	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠGreece,	 ﾠit	 ﾠfails	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
nature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠin	 ﾠother	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠtreats	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠ
problem	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠproblems;	 ﾠnot	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsystemic	 ﾠ
problem	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠearlier.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsystemic	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠingredients.	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠby	 ﾠacquiring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠemerging	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
sovereigns	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ member	 ﾠ states	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ monetary	 ﾠ union	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ fragilized,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ
unfavorable	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠsentiments	 ﾠcan	 ﾠforce	 ﾠthem	 ﾠinto	 ﾠdefault.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
pushing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠequilibrium,	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠby	 ﾠpunishingly	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠ
interest	 ﾠ rates,	 ﾠ chronically	 ﾠ high	 ﾠ budget	 ﾠ deficits,	 ﾠ low	 ﾠ growth	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ
banking	 ﾠcrisis.	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠintegration	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsovereigns	 ﾠare	 ﾠpushed	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠequilibrium,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠaffects	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠother	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠit	 ﾠfragilizes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
countries.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠare	 ﾠcreated,	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠit	 ﾠimpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠisolate	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠone	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone.	 ﾠPut	 ﾠdifferently,	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠone	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠa	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠa	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Eurozone.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠmy	 ﾠcontention	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ
designed	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠtake	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystemic	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠ
problem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
9.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernance?	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠaction.	 ﾠ
First,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcoordination	 ﾠfailure.	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdrive	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
bad	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐fulfilling	 ﾠmechanism.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcoordination	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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failure	 ﾠcan	 ﾠin	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsolved	 ﾠby	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠaction	 ﾠaimed	 ﾠat	 ﾠsteering	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠequilibrium.	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠcreates	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠ(mainly	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠcontagion).	 ﾠLike	 ﾠwith	 ﾠall	 ﾠexternalities,	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠaction	 ﾠmust	 ﾠconsist	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠinternalizing	 ﾠthese.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Collective	 ﾠaction	 ﾠand	 ﾠinternalization	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠat	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠlevels.	 ﾠOne	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbanks;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbudgets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Liquidity	 ﾠcrises	 ﾠare	 ﾠavoided	 ﾠin	 ﾠstand-ﾭ‐alone	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠissue	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
currencies	 ﾠ mainly	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ bank	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ forced	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
necessary	 ﾠ liquidity	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ sovereign.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ outcome	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ achieved	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
monetary	 ﾠ union	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ common	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ bank	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ willing	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ buy	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ
sovereigns’	 ﾠdebt.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhappened	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠ
crisis.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ ECB	 ﾠ bought	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ bonds	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ distressed	 ﾠ member-ﾭ‐countries,	 ﾠ
either	 ﾠdirectly,	 ﾠor	 ﾠindirectly	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠaccepted	 ﾠthese	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠas	 ﾠcollateral	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠits	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠdistressed	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ECB	 ﾠrechanneled	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠhit	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠcrisis,	 ﾠand	 ﾠprevented	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
centrifugal	 ﾠforces	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠby	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠbreaking	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠ“raison	 ﾠd’être”	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠpreserve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
monetary	 ﾠ union.	 ﾠ Yet,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ECB	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ severely	 ﾠ criticized	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ saving	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Eurozone	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcriticism,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠshows	 ﾠa	 ﾠblatant	 ﾠincomprehension	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
fundamentals	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠpowerful	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠconvince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ECB	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠoperation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone	 ﾠby	 ﾠother	 ﾠinstitutions,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠa	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Monetary	 ﾠFund.	 ﾠI	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠissue	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠsection.	 ﾠ
Collective	 ﾠaction	 ﾠand	 ﾠinternalization	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ
Ideally,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ budgetary	 ﾠ union	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ instrument	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ collective	 ﾠ action	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
internalization.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠconsolidating	 ﾠ(centralizing)	 ﾠnational	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbudgets	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠa	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠof	 ﾠautomatic	 ﾠtransfers	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠorganized.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
mechanism	 ﾠ works	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ insurance	 ﾠ mechanism	 ﾠ transferring	 ﾠ resources	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠ hit	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ negative	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ shock.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ addition,	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ consolidation	 ﾠ
creates	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠissue	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
control	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠauthority.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠso	 ﾠdoing,	 ﾠit	 ﾠprotects	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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forced	 ﾠinto	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠby	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠalso	 ﾠprotects	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentrifugal	 ﾠforces	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexert	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠsolution	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystemic	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠa	 ﾠfar-ﾭ‐reaching	 ﾠ
degree	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠunion.	 ﾠEconomists	 ﾠhave	 ﾠstressed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠunion	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠsustain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong	 ﾠrun	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Commission(1977)	 ﾠand	 ﾠDe	 ﾠGrauwe(1992)).	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
willingness	 ﾠin	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠto	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠunion.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠunwillingness	 ﾠto	 ﾠgo	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠof	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠunion	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠa	 ﾠfragile	 ﾠconstruction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmean,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠshould	 ﾠdespair.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠmove	 ﾠforward	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
taking	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠsteps.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠof	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠallows	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠsolve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
most	 ﾠ immediate	 ﾠ problems.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ signals	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ seriousness	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ
policymakers	 ﾠin	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠforward	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠof	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠunion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
10.	 ﾠA	 ﾠStrategy	 ﾠof	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthree	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeach	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠchanges.	 ﾠSome	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalready	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠtaken.	 ﾠUnfortunately,	 ﾠas	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠloaded	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthreaten	 ﾠto	 ﾠundermine	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠeffectiveness	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
10.1:	 ﾠA	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠMonetary	 ﾠFund	 ﾠ
An	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠstep	 ﾠwas	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠin	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠStability	 ﾠ
Facility	 ﾠ(EFSF)	 ﾠwas	 ﾠinstituted.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtransformed	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠpermanent	 ﾠ
fund,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠStabilization	 ﾠMechanism	 ﾠ(ESM),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwill	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ participating	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ loans	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
difficulties.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠa	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠMonetary	 ﾠFund	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠexistence,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwas	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠ
proposed	 ﾠby	 ﾠGros	 ﾠand	 ﾠMaier(2010).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ essential	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ESM	 ﾠ take	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ intelligent	 ﾠ approach	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ lending	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
distressed	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEFSF	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠnow.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ
applied	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEFSF	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIrish	 ﾠrescue	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠamounts	 ﾠto	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠ6%.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠ
interest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠunfortunate	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠby	 ﾠcharging	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
23	 ﾠ
rate	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ makes	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ difficult	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Irish	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ reduce	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ budget	 ﾠ
deficit	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠslow	 ﾠdown	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠaccumulation.	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠby	 ﾠcharging	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠpremium	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ 3%	 ﾠ above	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ risk	 ﾠ free	 ﾠ rate	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ German,	 ﾠ Dutch	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Austrian	 ﾠ
governments	 ﾠenjoy,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEFSF	 ﾠsignals	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠdefault,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIrish	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsucceed	 ﾠin	 ﾠputting	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
budgetary	 ﾠ house	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order.	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ wonder	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ markets	 ﾠ maintain	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
distrust	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐risk	 ﾠpremium.	 ﾠAll	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐fulfilling	 ﾠway,	 ﾠ
increases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefault.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠintelligent	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠin	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠin	 ﾠusing	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
carrot	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ stick.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ stick	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ conditionality,	 ﾠ i.e.	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ austerity	 ﾠ package	 ﾠ
spelled	 ﾠout	 ﾠover	 ﾠa	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠlong	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠof	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠgets	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
chance.	 ﾠWithout	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠburdens	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠdecline.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcarrot	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
concessional	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠeasier	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠto	 ﾠstop	 ﾠ
debt	 ﾠaccumulation.	 ﾠA	 ﾠlow	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠalso	 ﾠexpresses	 ﾠtrust	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
package;	 ﾠtrust	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠneed	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠinduce	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠUnfortunately,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠESM	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠapply	 ﾠan	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ200	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠabove	 ﾠits	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠrate.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
no	 ﾠgood	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠESM	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthis.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠapplying	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠpremium,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠESM	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠsignal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtruly	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
lending	 ﾠprogram.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠare	 ﾠother	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠESM	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠundermine	 ﾠits	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠstabilize	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone.	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠ2013	 ﾠon,	 ﾠall	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Eurozone	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ obliged	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ introduce	 ﾠ “collective	 ﾠ actions	 ﾠ clauses”	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ
issue	 ﾠnew	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing.	 ﾠ
When	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture,	 ﾠa	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠturns	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠESM	 ﾠto	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠ
funding,	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠbondholders	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠasked	 ﾠto	 ﾠshare	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrestructuring	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
debt.	 ﾠPut	 ﾠdifferently,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠasked	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlosses.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
seem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠdecision.	 ﾠBondholders	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠforced	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠtwice	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
invest	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ bonds,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ bonds	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ secure	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ
thought.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠintention	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgood;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠDe	 ﾠGrauwe(2010)).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
fact	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalready	 ﾠseen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠmade	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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first	 ﾠ proposal	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ introduce	 ﾠ collective	 ﾠ action	 ﾠ clauses	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ Council	 ﾠ
meeting	 ﾠof	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠwas	 ﾠto	 ﾠintensify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Eurozone	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠI	 ﾠshow	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠin	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ11,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
presents	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbond	 ﾠspreads	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠseen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠmeeting	 ﾠof	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ28-ﾭ‐29,	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ announcement	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ made	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ attach	 ﾠ collective	 ﾠ action	 ﾠ clauses	 ﾠ
(CACs)	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ future	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ bond	 ﾠ issues,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ bond	 ﾠ spreads	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Ireland,	 ﾠ Portugal	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Spain	 ﾠ shot	 ﾠ up	 ﾠ almost	 ﾠ immediately.	 ﾠ Since	 ﾠ then	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ
spreads	 ﾠhave	 ﾠremained	 ﾠhigh.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcontrasts	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ
meetings,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠeither	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspreads,	 ﾠor	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ




The	 ﾠreaction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠannouncement	 ﾠof	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠCACs	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠsurprising.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠbondholders	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠautomatically	 ﾠloose	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠturns	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠESM,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwill	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠcompensated	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadded	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠmore	 ﾠimportantly,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠtime	 ﾠthey	 ﾠsuspect	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠmay	 ﾠturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ESM	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwill	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠsell	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbonds,	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠa	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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loss.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠselling	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠwill	 ﾠraise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠon	 ﾠthese	 ﾠbonds,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠit	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠask	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ESM.	 ﾠ
Thus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠaction	 ﾠclauses	 ﾠwill	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
fragile	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠto	 ﾠspeculative	 ﾠfears.	 ﾠI	 ﾠargued	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystemic	 ﾠ
problem	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠlies	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠ
governments	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠvulnerable	 ﾠto	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠcrises	 ﾠtriggered	 ﾠby	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
confidence	 ﾠin	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠInstead	 ﾠof	 ﾠalleviating	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠ
action	 ﾠ clauses	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ intensify	 ﾠ it,	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ decline	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ confidence	 ﾠ
bondholders	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ“run	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcover”	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠlosses,	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠtriggering	 ﾠa	 ﾠcrisis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
CACs	 ﾠdowngrade	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠemerging	 ﾠ
markets	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthese	 ﾠclauses	 ﾠwere	 ﾠinvented.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠquite	 ﾠextraordinary	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠleaders	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“solution”	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystemic	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwill	 ﾠturn	 ﾠout	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthat	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsevere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ another	 ﾠ feature	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ESM	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ instead	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ solving	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ problem	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ
actually	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ pronounced.	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ argued	 ﾠ earlier	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ member	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠare	 ﾠpushed	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠequilibrium,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠloose	 ﾠ
much	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠapply	 ﾠthe	 ﾠautomatic	 ﾠstabilizers	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠduring	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
recession.	 ﾠCountries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠapply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠESM	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubjected	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
tough	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠausterity	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠfor	 ﾠobtaining	 ﾠfinance.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠeach	 ﾠrecession,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠforced	 ﾠto	 ﾠturn	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠESM	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠobliged	 ﾠto	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠpro-ﾭ‐cyclical	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
reduce	 ﾠspending	 ﾠand	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠtaxes.	 ﾠA	 ﾠsure	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecession	 ﾠworse.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠpro-ﾭ‐cyclicality	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbudgets	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠachievement	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
developed	 ﾠ world.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ led	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ business	 ﾠ cycle	 ﾠ stability	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠ welfare,	 ﾠ shielding	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ harshness	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ booms	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ busts	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
capitalist	 ﾠ systems.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ESM	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ up,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ risks	 ﾠ
undermining	 ﾠthis	 ﾠachievement.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
All	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ quite	 ﾠ unfortunate.	 ﾠ Especially	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ existence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠ mechanism	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Eurozone	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ great	 ﾠ idea	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ step	 ﾠ
forwards	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ building	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ integrated	 ﾠ Europe	 ﾠ (Peirce,	 ﾠ Micossi,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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Carmassi(2011)).	 ﾠ Unfortunately,	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ introducing	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ kinds	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ restrictions	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
conditions,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠESM	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠtransformed	 ﾠinto	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠunlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
produce	 ﾠmore	 ﾠstability	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
10.2:	 ﾠJoint	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠEurobonds	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠ second	 ﾠ step	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ union	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ thus	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ strengthening	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Eurozone	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjoint	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠEurobonds.	 ﾠA	 ﾠjoint	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠEurobonds	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternalizing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
identified	 ﾠearlier.	 ﾠ
By	 ﾠjointly	 ﾠissuing	 ﾠEurobonds,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticipating	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠjointly	 ﾠliable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ debt	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ issued	 ﾠ together.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ visible	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ constraining	 ﾠ
commitment	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠconvince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠare	 ﾠserious	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ future	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ euro	 ﾠ (see	 ﾠ Verhofstadt(2009),	 ﾠ Juncker	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
Tremonti(2010)).	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ addition,	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ pooling	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ issue	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ bonds,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
member	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠprotect	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdestabilizing	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠcrises	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ arise	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ inability	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ control	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ currency	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ debt	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
issued.	 ﾠA	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠbond	 ﾠissue	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsuffer	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproblem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠof	 ﾠissuing	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠEurobonds	 ﾠhas	 ﾠmet	 ﾠstiff	 ﾠresistance	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠIssing(2010)).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠresistance	 ﾠis	 ﾠunderstandable.	 ﾠA	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠ
Eurobond	 ﾠcreates	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠserious	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaddressed.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ problem	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ moral	 ﾠ hazard.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ common	 ﾠ Eurobond	 ﾠ issue	 ﾠ contains	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
implicit	 ﾠinsurance	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticipating	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠare	 ﾠcollectively	 ﾠ
responsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjoint	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠissue,	 ﾠan	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠis	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠto	 ﾠrely	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ implicit	 ﾠ insurance	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ issue	 ﾠ too	 ﾠ much	 ﾠ debt.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ creates	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ lot	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
resistance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbehave	 ﾠresponsibly.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠunlikely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠstep	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠEurobond	 ﾠissue	 ﾠunless	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠ
hazard	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠis	 ﾠresolved.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠ second	 ﾠ problem	 ﾠ (not	 ﾠ unrelated	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ previous	 ﾠ one)	 ﾠ arises	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠlike	 ﾠGermany,	 ﾠFinland	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNetherlands	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠprofit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtriple	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
ratings	 ﾠ allowing	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ obtain	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ best	 ﾠ possible	 ﾠ borrowing	 ﾠ conditions.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠarises	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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inconceivable	 ﾠthat	 ﾠby	 ﾠjoining	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠenjoying	 ﾠless	 ﾠfavourable	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠratings,	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠlike	 ﾠGermany,	 ﾠFinland	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNetherlands	 ﾠmay	 ﾠactually	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdebt.	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠobjections	 ﾠare	 ﾠserious.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaddressed	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠcareful	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
common	 ﾠEurobond	 ﾠmechanism.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠEurobonds	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ eliminate	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ moral	 ﾠ hazard	 ﾠ risk	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ produce	 ﾠ sufficient	 ﾠ
attractiveness	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ favourable	 ﾠ credit	 ﾠ ratings.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
achieved	 ﾠby	 ﾠworking	 ﾠboth	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquantities	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpricing	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurobonds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Thus,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠseek	 ﾠa	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurobond	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠ
made	 ﾠby	 ﾠBruegel	 ﾠ(Delpla	 ﾠand	 ﾠvon	 ﾠWeizsäcker(2010)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠmade	 ﾠby	 ﾠDe	 ﾠ
Grauwe	 ﾠand	 ﾠMoesen	 ﾠ(2009).	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠwork	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows.	 ﾠCountries	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠparticipate	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjoint	 ﾠEurobond	 ﾠissue	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠ60%	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠGDP,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠ
“blue	 ﾠbonds”.	 ﾠAnything	 ﾠabove	 ﾠ60%	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠissued	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠbond	 ﾠ
markets	 ﾠ(“red	 ﾠbonds”).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠa	 ﾠsenior	 ﾠ(blue)	 ﾠtranche	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
enjoy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠrating.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠjunior	 ﾠ(red)	 ﾠtranche	 ﾠwould	 ﾠface	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
premium.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠpremium	 ﾠwould	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠa	 ﾠpowerful	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ governments	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ reduce	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ debt	 ﾠ levels.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ fact,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ likely	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
interest	 ﾠ rate	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ pay	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ red	 ﾠ bonds	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
higher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠthey	 ﾠpay	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠoutstanding	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠ
Gros(2010)	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ this).	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ reason	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ creating	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ senior	 ﾠ tranche,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
probability	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjunior	 ﾠtranche	 ﾠmay	 ﾠactually	 ﾠincrease.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠto	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠred	 ﾠcomponent	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbond	 ﾠ
issues.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠBruegel	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcriticized	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠgrounds.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠis	 ﾠunchanged,	 ﾠrestructuring	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠinto	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠtranches	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠits	 ﾠrisk.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠblue	 ﾠbond	 ﾠ
carries	 ﾠa	 ﾠlower	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠred	 ﾠbond	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠborrowing	 ﾠcost	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠas	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠbond	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠGros(2011)).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠModigliani-ﾭ‐Miller	 ﾠ
theorem	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ says	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ value	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ firm	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ unaffected	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
liabilities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠare	 ﾠstructured.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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All	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠis	 ﾠunchanged.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpoint,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠbond	 ﾠissue	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstrument	 ﾠto	 ﾠshield	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠpushed	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠequilibrium.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠbond	 ﾠissue	 ﾠsucceeds	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
doing	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠdecline.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠare	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠenjoy	 ﾠa	 ﾠlower	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠborrowing	 ﾠcost.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ time	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ marginal	 ﾠ borrowing	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ likely	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ higher	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
average.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠone	 ﾠwants	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave:	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecline	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠ
cost,	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdebt.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠeasier	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠservice	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdebt;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdebt.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠhazard	 ﾠrisk.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠworks	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpricing	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurobonds	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
follows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠmade	 ﾠby	 ﾠDe	 ﾠGrauwe	 ﾠand	 ﾠMoesen(2009).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
using	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfees	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠparticipating	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠblue	 ﾠbond	 ﾠissue.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠ
fees	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticipating	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ high	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ debt	 ﾠ levels	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ face	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ higher	 ﾠ fee,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlower	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠwould	 ﾠpay	 ﾠa	 ﾠlower	 ﾠfee.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠterms	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
means	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠpaid	 ﾠby	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠblue	 ﾠbond	 ﾠtranche	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠdifferent.	 ﾠFiscally	 ﾠprudent	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠa	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠlower	 ﾠ
interest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠthan	 ﾠfiscally	 ﾠless	 ﾠprudent	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠblue	 ﾠ
bond	 ﾠissue	 ﾠwould	 ﾠremain	 ﾠattractive	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠrating,	 ﾠ
thereby	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠthem	 ﾠan	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠto	 ﾠjoint	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurobond	 ﾠmechanism.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ noted	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ successful,	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ common	 ﾠ Eurobond	 ﾠ issue	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ
create	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠnew	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠlot	 ﾠof	 ﾠliquidity.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠattract	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro	 ﾠa	 ﾠreserve	 ﾠcurrency.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠeuro	 ﾠwould	 ﾠprofit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠpremium.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
combined	 ﾠ liquidity	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ reserve	 ﾠ currency	 ﾠ premium	 ﾠ enjoyed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ dollar	 ﾠ
amounts	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ approximately	 ﾠ 50	 ﾠ basis	 ﾠ points	 ﾠ (Gourinchas	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Rey(2007)).	 ﾠ A	 ﾠ
similar	 ﾠpremium	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠenjoyed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠeuro	 ﾠzone	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠto	 ﾠlower	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠborrowing,	 ﾠvery	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠlike	 ﾠ




10.3:	 ﾠCoordination	 ﾠof	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠ third	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ step	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ process	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ union	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ
constraints	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ national	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ policies	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ member	 ﾠ states	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Eurozone.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ while	 ﾠ monetary	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ fully	 ﾠ centralized,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ
instruments	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ policies	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ remained	 ﾠ firmly	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ hands	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
national	 ﾠ governments	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ serious	 ﾠ design	 ﾠ failure	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Eurozone.	 ﾠ Ideally,	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠshould	 ﾠhand	 ﾠover	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠ institutions.	 ﾠ However,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ willingness	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ take	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ drastic	 ﾠ step	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠunion	 ﾠis	 ﾠcompletely	 ﾠabsent.	 ﾠHere	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
taken.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ Commission	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ proposed	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ scoreboard	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ macroeconomic	 ﾠ
variables	 ﾠ(private	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdebt,	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠimbalances,	 ﾠcompetitiveness	 ﾠ
measures,	 ﾠhouse	 ﾠprices)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmonitored,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
push	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠusing	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠ
greater	 ﾠconvergence	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmacroeconomic	 ﾠvariables.	 ﾠFailure	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠaction	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
eliminate	 ﾠthese	 ﾠimbalances	 ﾠcould	 ﾠtrigger	 ﾠa	 ﾠsanctioning	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠvery	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ spirit	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ sanctioning	 ﾠ mechanism	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Stability	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Growth	 ﾠ Pact	 ﾠ
(European	 ﾠCommission(2010)).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ step	 ﾠ forward,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ approach	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ incomplete.	 ﾠ National	 ﾠ
governments	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ relatively	 ﾠ little	 ﾠ control	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ macroeconomic	 ﾠ
variables	 ﾠtargeted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐crisis	 ﾠdivergence	 ﾠdynamics	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠby	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠdevelopments	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnational	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠhad	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠcontrol.	 ﾠ
Local	 ﾠbooms	 ﾠand	 ﾠbubbles	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiphery	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠby	 ﾠbank	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠexpansion.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠvividly	 ﾠshown	 ﾠin	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ12.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠbubbles	 ﾠ(especially	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠmarkets)	 ﾠand	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠ
expansion	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ makes	 ﾠ bubbles	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ lethal	 ﾠ (see	 ﾠ Borio(2003)).	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠmade	 ﾠvary	 ﾠclear	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠand	 ﾠIreland.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Thus,	 ﾠany	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠaimed	 ﾠat	 ﾠstabilizing	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠmust	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
control	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠcreation.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Eurozone	 ﾠhave	 ﾠentered	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠthey	 ﾠlack	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
this.	 ﾠPut	 ﾠdifferently,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠof	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠare	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠby	 ﾠcredit-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ
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fueled	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠspirits	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
monetary	 ﾠ instruments.	 ﾠ Members	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ monetary	 ﾠ union,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
relinquished	 ﾠthese	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠauthorities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ next	 ﾠ question	 ﾠ then	 ﾠ becomes:	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ monetary	 ﾠ authorities,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB,	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠout	 ﾠnational	 ﾠgovernments?	 ﾠWe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠtold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
impossible	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ECB	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ concerned	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ system-ﾭ‐wide	 ﾠ
aggregates.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnational	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠconditions.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
reason	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠone	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmaintenances	 ﾠof	 ﾠprice	 ﾠstability	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠwhole,	 ﾠand	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠinstrument	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
goal.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠis	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠcheap	 ﾠan	 ﾠanswer.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ
stability	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠstability.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠerupted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Eurozone	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠhad	 ﾠits	 ﾠorigin	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠfocuses	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠon	 ﾠsystem-ﾭ‐wide	 ﾠaggregates	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠ happens	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ individual	 ﾠ countries.	 ﾠ Excessive	 ﾠ bank	 ﾠ credit	 ﾠ creation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠshould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠappear	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠradar	 ﾠscreen	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠFrankfurt	 ﾠupon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠshould	 ﾠact.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ12	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠKannan,	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2009)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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One	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ object	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ECB	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ instruments	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ deal	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ
excessive	 ﾠbank	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠin	 ﾠparts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠso.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Eurosystem	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠrestrict	 ﾠbank	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠthan	 ﾠin	 ﾠothers	 ﾠby	 ﾠapplying	 ﾠdifferential	 ﾠminimum	 ﾠreserve	 ﾠrequirements,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠ imposing	 ﾠ anti-ﾭ‐cyclical	 ﾠ capital	 ﾠ ratios.	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ used	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ
stabilizing	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Another	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠsupervisors	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
deal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠexcessive	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠby	 ﾠbanks.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠextend	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠsheets,	 ﾠnational	 ﾠsupervisors	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ
intervene.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ undoubtedly	 ﾠ so.	 ﾠ At	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ time	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ absolve	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Eurosystem	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ responsibility	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ maintaining	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ stability.	 ﾠ When	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
credit-ﾭ‐fueled	 ﾠboom	 ﾠemerges	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurosystem	 ﾠto	 ﾠact.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEurosystem	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpowerful	 ﾠtoolkit	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
controlling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmacroeconomic	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠbooms	 ﾠand	 ﾠbusts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠreforms	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupervisory	 ﾠlandscape	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
scope	 ﾠfor	 ﾠaction	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurosystem.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠSystemic	 ﾠRisk	 ﾠBoard	 ﾠ(ESRB)	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠVery	 ﾠpointedly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
president	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠwill	 ﾠalso	 ﾠpreside	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠESRB.	 ﾠThus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcreators	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ESRB	 ﾠhave	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmonitoring	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
emerging	 ﾠsystemic	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠquite	 ﾠparadoxical	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
president	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠESRB	 ﾠ(ECB)	 ﾠwould	 ﾠemit	 ﾠwarning	 ﾠsignals	 ﾠabout	 ﾠsystemic	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠthen	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfollow-ﾭ‐up	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwarning	 ﾠby	 ﾠaction	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisks,	 ﾠleaving	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠnational	 ﾠsupervisors	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠalone.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ steps	 ﾠ described	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ previous	 ﾠ sections,	 ﾠ involving	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
responsibilities	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ national	 ﾠ governments,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ institutions	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Eurosystem	 ﾠare	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠmove	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠunion.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠalso	 ﾠgive	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠ signal	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ markets	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ member	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Eurozone	 ﾠare	 ﾠserious	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠto	 ﾠguarantee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurvival	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone.	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠ steps	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ seen	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ commitment	 ﾠ devices	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ enhance	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
credibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠare	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠin	 ﾠstabilizing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ




A	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠone	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠand	 ﾠone	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank.	 ﾠCountries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
join	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ monetary	 ﾠ union	 ﾠ loose	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ instrument	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ
(interest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠor	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrate).	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠentering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠloose	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠissue	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfull	 ﾠcontrol.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
result,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ loss	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ confidence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ investors	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐fulfilling	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ drive	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠinto	 ﾠdefault.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠso	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠissuing	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
own	 ﾠ currency.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ bank	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ always	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
liquidity	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠdefault.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmay	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠinflation,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
shields	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠforced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Thus,	 ﾠ member-ﾭ‐countries	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ monetary	 ﾠ union	 ﾠ become	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ vulnerable.	 ﾠ
Changing	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠsentiments	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“sudden	 ﾠstops”	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠdebt,	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠin	 ﾠmotion	 ﾠa	 ﾠdevilish	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
solvency	 ﾠ crises.	 ﾠ There	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ implication	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ increased	 ﾠ
vulnerability.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmember-ﾭ‐countries	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠloose	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠ capacity	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ apply	 ﾠ counter-ﾭ‐cyclical	 ﾠ budgetary	 ﾠ policies.	 ﾠ When	 ﾠ during	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
recession	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠdeficits	 ﾠincrease,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠa	 ﾠloss	 ﾠof	 ﾠconfidence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
investors	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠto	 ﾠservice	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdebt.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ raising	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ interest	 ﾠ rate,	 ﾠ making	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ recession	 ﾠ worse,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ leading	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ
higher	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠdeficits.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠforced	 ﾠ
into	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ bad	 ﾠ equilibrium,	 ﾠ characterized	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ deflation,	 ﾠ high	 ﾠ interest	 ﾠ rates,	 ﾠ high	 ﾠ
budget	 ﾠdeficits	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠcrisis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠsystemic	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠ
into	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone.	 ﾠToo	 ﾠ
much	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠnew	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠ(based	 ﾠon	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠ
hazard	 ﾠthinking)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠdeficits	 ﾠand	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠ
debts,	 ﾠit	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpunished	 ﾠby	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrates	 ﾠand	 ﾠtough	 ﾠausterity	 ﾠprograms.	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠhave	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠis	 ﾠusually	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhelpful	 ﾠin	 ﾠrestoring	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠ
balance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ addition,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ features	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ design	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ assistance	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Eurozone	 ﾠas	 ﾠembodied	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠESM,	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠto	 ﾠshifting	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠsentiments.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“collective	 ﾠaction	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
33	 ﾠ
clauses”	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Eurozone,	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ nervousness	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ markets.	 ﾠ With	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ
recession	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbondholders,	 ﾠfearing	 ﾠhaircuts,	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrun	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcover,	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠ
making	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely.	 ﾠAll	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠloose	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠlet	 ﾠthe	 ﾠautomatic	 ﾠstabilizers	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠplay	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠstabilizing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠcreates	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠproblems.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠone	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
debt	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠrepercussions	 ﾠin	 ﾠother	 ﾠmember	 ﾠ
countries.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ monetary	 ﾠ union	 ﾠ leads	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ intense	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ
integration.	 ﾠWhether	 ﾠone	 ﾠlikes	 ﾠit	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠare	 ﾠforced	 ﾠto	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ out.	 ﾠ Surely,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ right	 ﾠ incentives	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
governments	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠprofligacy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠcrisis.	 ﾠDiscipline	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠis	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠscheme.	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠargued,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ too	 ﾠ much	 ﾠ importance	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ punishment	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ
enough	 ﾠto	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ excessive	 ﾠ emphasis	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ punishment	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ responsible	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ refusal	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
introduce	 ﾠnew	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠprotect	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvagaries	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ markets	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ trap	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ debt	 ﾠ crisis	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ bad	 ﾠ
equilibrium.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds.	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠbond	 ﾠissue	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠ
defense	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvagaries	 ﾠof	 ﾠeuphoria	 ﾠand	 ﾠfears	 ﾠthat	 ﾠregularly	 ﾠgrip	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠcan	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠof	 ﾠmutual	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontrol.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠexists	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠunion.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ absence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ union,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ member	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Eurozone	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
condemned	 ﾠto	 ﾠfill	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠpieces	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠmechanism.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
debt	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠmade	 ﾠit	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠfill	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠfew	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpieces.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
achieved,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠis	 ﾠstill	 ﾠfar	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠto	 ﾠguarantee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurvival	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Eurozone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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